SGX and cryptocurrencies

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Overview

Goal: Improve blockchain technologies using SGX, a hardware trusted computing platform.

- SGX Overview
- Consensus
- Smart Contracts
- Issues
- Summary

Lightning talk: automatic analysis and proof of correctness of smart contracts
SGX Overview
SGX

Key parts:

- Isolation
- Attestation
- Platform services
SGX

Key parts:

- Isolation
- Attestation
- Platform services
A new set of CPU instructions available on Intel Skylake microarchitecture.
Run code in a hardware-protected container, called an enclave.
Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions)

Isolated from other software, even the operating system kernel.
Pure computation, plus the enclave can talk to the application that embeds it.
Intel SGX (Software Guard Extensions)

How does the code know that it's really running in an SGX enclave?
SGX

Key parts:

- Isolation
- **Attestation**
- Platform services
SGX Remote Attestation

If the CPU had a key, could it sign something?

The CPU can’t prove anything to the enclave.

But the CPU can prove something to someone else.
SGX Remote Attestation

The attestation protocol proves that a specific piece of code ran on suitable hardware, producing a specific result.

The proof is a signed statement (by the CPU’s key), called a quote.

You can contact Intel’s server to verify the quote.
SGX

Key parts:

- Isolation
- Attestation
- Platform services
Intel SGX Platform Services

Augments SGX instructions with Intel-provided closed-source components:

- Set up the CPU to create quotes
  - Provisioning enclave
  - Launch enclave
  - Quoting enclave
- Platform service enclaves
  - Monotonic counters
  - Trusted relative time
How can SGX help with blockchains, cryptocurrencies, and smart contracts?
Consensus
SGX and proof of work

Run existing proof of work schemes inside enclave

Create a quote for results

// Inside SGX.
1: function sgxPoW(nonce, difficulty)
2:   result ← ORIGINALPoW(nonce, difficulty)
3:   assert ORIGINALPoWSUCCESS(result)
4:   return SGX.REPORT({<nonce, difficulty>})
5: end function

Verify by validating quote

// Outside SGX.
6: function PoW(nonce, difficulty)
7:   report ← sgxPoW(nonce, difficulty)
8:   return SGX.QUOTE(report, null)
9: end function
SGX and proof of work

Sidesteps the ASIC vs. non-ASIC debate

Democratizes mining
SGX and proof of work

Wrap other kinds of work. Even useful work?

Doesn’t need efficient proof algorithm

Security depends on SGX
Proof of time

Proof of work schemes are energy inefficient.

We can use SGX to simulate proof of work on input $X$:

- Figure out how long the work on $X$ would take
- Wait for that long; **don’t do any computation**
- Return a quote to prove that you waited for $X$

```plaintext
// Inside SGX.
1: counter ← incrementMonotonicCounter()
2: function sgxPOT(nonce, duration)
3:     SLEEP(duration)
4:     newCounter ← readMonotonicCounter()
5:     assert counter ← newCounter
6:     return SGX.REPORT((nonce, duration))
7: end function

// Outside SGX.
8: function PoT(nonce, duration)
9:     report ← sgxPOT(nonce, duration)
10:    return SGX.QUOTE(report, null)
11: end function
```
Proof of time

// Inside SGX.
1: counter ← incrementMonotonicCounter()

2: function sgxPOT(nonce, duration)
3:    sleep(duration)
4:    newCounter ← readMonotonicCounter()
5:    assert counter = newCounter
6:    return SGX.REPORT((nonce, duration))
7: end function

// Outside SGX.
8: function POT(nonce, duration)
9:    report ← sgxPOT(nonce, duration)
10:   return SGX.QUOTE(report, null)
11: end function
Proof of time - Intel Distributed Ledger

Intel’s own distributed ledger project (Sawtooth Lake) waits a random amount of time in an enclave. Time waited is similar to Bitcoin.

https://github.com/intelledger
Proof of time - Intel Distributed Ledger

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Proof of time 🕒 - Intel Distributed Ledger

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\[
\Pr[X = x] = (1 - p)^{k-1} p
\]

https://github.com/intelledger
Proof of time

// Inside SGX.
1: \textit{counter} \leftarrow \textsc{incrementMonotonicCounter}()

2: \textbf{function} \textsc{sgxPOT}(\textit{nonce, duration})
3: \textbf{SLEEP}(\textit{duration})
4: \textit{newCounter} \leftarrow \textsc{readMonotonicCounter}()
5: \textbf{assert} \textit{counter} = \textit{newCounter}
6: \textbf{return} \textsc{sgx.report}((\textit{nonce, duration}))
7: \textbf{end function}

// Outside SGX.
8: \textbf{function} \textsc{POT}(\textit{nonce, duration})
9: \textit{report} \leftarrow \textsc{sgxPOT}(\textit{nonce, duration})
10: \textbf{return} \textsc{sgx.quote}((\textit{report, null})
11: \textbf{end function}
Proof of time - Implementation

- Secure Sleep
- Record start time
- Return to untrusted
- Waited enough?
  - Y: Done
  - N: Waited enough?

Service enclave
Proof of time - Implementation

Key challenge: prevent parallel execution

- Doesn't use all CPU resources
- How can enclave instances know about each other?
Proof of time - Implementation

Key challenge: prevent parallel execution

Solution: counters

- (during node setup) create a monotonic counter
  `sgx_create_monotonic_counter(*counter_uuid, *value)`
- increment a monotonic counter when you start
  `sgx_increment_monotonic_counter(*counter_uuid, *value)`
- sleep
- check that it's still the same
  `sgx_read_monotonic_counter(*counter_uuid, *value)`
Proof of time - Implementation

Key challenge: prevent parallel execution

Solution: counters

- (during node setup) create a monotonic counter
  \texttt{sgx\_create\_monotonic\_counter(*counter\_uuid, *value)}

- increment a monotonic counter when you start
  \texttt{sgx\_increment\_monotonic\_counter(*counter\_uuid, *value)}

- sleep

- check that it’s still the same
  \texttt{sgx\_read\_monotonic\_counter(*counter\_uuid, *value)}
Proof of time - Implementation

Key challenge: what was our monotonic counter?

- Communication must pass through untrusted application
- Storage must pass through untrusted application
Proof of time - Implementation

Key challenge: which monotonic counter?

Solution: all of them

```
SGX_ERROR_MC_OVER_QUOTA
The enclave has reached the quota(256) of Monotonic Counters it can maintain
```

Proof of time - Implementation

Key challenge: which monotonic counter?

Solution: all of them

- create 256 monotonic counters
- sleep
- make sure you still have all 256
Proof of time - Compromised CPUs

Big incentive to compromise individual CPUs

You can mine way faster than the rest of the network

Intel manages a revocation list of known compromised CPUs
Proof of time

Desirable properties:

- ASICs provide no advantage
- No wasted energy

But CPU compromise is still an issue

Reduces mining to ownership of SGX CPUs
Proof of ownership

Just count number of CPUs “voting” for a new block

The votes (SGX quotes) are privacy preserving

Intel’s Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) algorithm can determine whether two quotes with same name came from the same CPU or not

// Inside SGX.
1: function sgxPoO(nonce)
2:  return SGX.REPORT(nonce)
3: end function

// Outside SGX.
4: function PoO(nonce)
5:  report ← sgxPoO(nonce)
   // We use nonce for the quote name.
6:  return SGX.QUOTE(report, nonce)
7: end function
Proof of ownership

Scalability: Name Base Mode

With Name Base Mode, the scheme implementer must ensure a particular name is not used too much.

Proof of ownership

Scalability: network messages

Every node votes on each block

That’s a lot of votes
## Consensus Overview

<table>
<thead>
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<th>ASIC resistant</th>
<th>Energy efficient</th>
<th>Time efficient</th>
<th>Scalable</th>
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<tr>
<td>SGX proof of work</td>
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<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of time</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proof of ownership</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Working on combining these to compensate for individual schemes’ shortcomings
Smart Contracts
Smart Contracts

One node executes the contract in an enclave

Create a quote with the result

Disseminate the quote

Easily combine confidentiality and auditability
Smart Contracts

Only one node has to execute the contract

Others just verify the quote

Non-deterministic contract code

Reduces smart contracts to availability
Issues
Issue #1
Unclear licensing and terms of use for SGX by Intel

SGX is being shipped in hardware, but to launch an enclave, it has to be authorized by Intel’s launch enclave.

It is unclear how will launch enclave decide that, probably based on a business partnership with Intel.

Intel might terminate previously given authorization to launch at their discretion.
Issue #2
Centralized remote attestation service

To do a remote attestation, you have to contact Intel’s cloud service.*

This allows them to verify quotes against compromised CPUs and other revocation lists.

A 3rd party (decentralized?) alternative might be possible to be implemented.

But would they allow such 3rd party enclave to run?

Issue #3
Disabled by default

A BIOS setting.

Not a problem for miners, but what about non-technical end-users?

Mobile (thin) devices don't even have SGX.
Summary

Promising new primitives. More work needed to create a robust, tamper-proof solution.

Already a nice match to augment permissioned and centralized cryptocurrencies and give additional trust anchor to simplify and optimize the rest of the stack.

Unclear if suitable for decentralized cryptocurrencies: an open ecosystem around SGX would help alleviate concerns.
Towards Automation of Correctness Proofs of Smart Contracts

Dawn Song

Joint work with Aymeric Fromherz
Smart Contract is Hard to Get Right

- Smart contract can be complex & subtle
- Corner cases may not be handled properly
  - E.g., leaking money in certain cases [Shi et al.]
- No tools to help analyze & prove correctness of smart contracts
Automatic Correctness Proof via Coq

Diagram:
- Ethereum Contracts
- Property Annotation
- Compiler
- Coq code + Theorems
- Lemma Generator
- Lemma Libraries
- Proof Structure Tactics
- Coq Theorem Prover
- Correctness proof
- Error
Example: Preservation Property

● Certain property of global state stay constant over state changes
  ○ Banking system: Total money across different accounts stay constant at any point
  ○ Auction system: there is one highest bidder in the system at any point
  ○ Voting system: total counts (votes + non-votes) stay the same in the system at any point

● Automatic proof
  ○ Proof structure tactics for preservation property
  ○ Automatic generation of lemma libraries

● Proofs & errors found in real-world ethereum contracts
Conclusion

- Smart contract is hard to get right
- First step towards automatic analysis and proof of correctness of smart contract
- Lots more to do